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Abstract: The debate on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Palestine 
has emerged within the context of the peace process between Israel and 
Palestinians, in particular following the Oslo agreement in 1993. There 
are different perceptions of the significance and relevance of SSR in the 
Palestinian context, and these depend on ideological, political 
allegiances and interests of domestic, regional and international actors 
talking about SSR. Some blame the Israeli occupation and military 
activities and also the governance of the Palestinian security sector for 
the deterioration of internal security. Others consider that the SSR is 
an integral element of the process of state-building to allow the 
Palestinians to establish an effective authority over their territories. 
However, Israel and external actors like the United States and the 
European Union still look at Palestinian SSR as a means to confront 
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“terror and violence” and to prevent the emergence of any dangers to 
Israel. Israeli occupation and internal political divisions described and 
analyzed in this article as major challenges for Palestinian SSR. In 
addition, this article argues that this reform is not an end in itself, but 
is a necessary and a fundamental element to achieve the Palestinian 
national project in terms of liberation and state-building.  
Key Words: Security Sector Reform; Arab-Israeli Conflict; Conflict 
Resolution; Occupation; Peace Process; Palestinian Political Division 
 
Introduction 
 
Security is a key issue in all peace agreements between Israel and 
Palestine as well as in all the regional and international diplomatic 
initiatives to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The debate on Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) in Palestine has emerged within this context, in 
particular following the Oslo Accords in 1993. It is strongly influenced 
by internal and external issues that must be addressed. Therefore, 
there are different perceptions of the significance and relevance of SSR 
in the Palestinian context, and these depend on ideological, political 
allegiances and interests of domestic, regional and international actors 
talking about SSR. Some blame the Israeli occupation and military 
activities and also the governance of the Palestinian security sector for 
the deterioration of internal security. Others consider that the SSR is an 
integral element of the process of state-building to allow Palestinians 
to establish an effective authority over their territories. However, 
Israel and external actors like the United States and the European 
Union still look at Palestinian SSR as a means to confront “terror and 
violence” and to prevent the emergence of any threats to Israel. 
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This study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the 
challenges of the Palestinian SSR and analyze its significance within 
the specific national context. In fact, this topic is widely tackled by 
many Palestinian intellectuals and foreign researchers. The literature is 
dominated by the works of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF) as well as the studies and surveys carried out 
by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA) (Friedrich, 2004). In addition, the research programs both of 
the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and The United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP) provide a good contribution to 
understanding several questions related to the Palestinian SSR. 
However, this study does not seek to tell what other researchers have 
done in this research area. Its major contribution is to reorganize the 
debate on SSR in the light of the specific Palestinian context. By doing 
so, data used in this paper are based on the existing work mostly 
relates to the Oslo period and post-Oslo reform initiatives launched by 
the Palestinian Authority. In view of the previous research works, two 
major questions remain unanswered: in which conflict stage 
(pre-conflict, conflict or post-conflict) Palestinian SSR should be placed? 
What are the priorities of this reform in terms of the challenges it 
faces? 
First, it should be noted that the literature on the Palestinian SSR 
focuses largely on the post-conflict period. Several academic works on 
this topic state that the situation in Palestine falls neatly enough into 
this category since the conclusion of the Oslo agreements in 1993. In 
fact, the debate on SSR in Palestinian policy circles has emerged within 
this context, called the “peace process”. Since a plethora of academic 
works, non-governmental reports, such as those published by the 
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International Crisis Group, policy papers and technical dimensions of 
SSR have been written to analyze the reform agenda of the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) in this field (Weinberger, 1995; Brynen, 
2008). However, the adequate analytical framework to study the 
Palestinian case is the period of conflict resolution and democratic 
transition in terms of the transformation of the Palestinian political 
regime from authoritarian rule to democracy. For the period of conflict 
resolution, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not yet resolved and the SSR is 
still deeply embedded in this conflict. Unlike in other political contexts 
– such as Eastern Europe, Africa or Middle East – Palestinian context is 
unique because PNA is not a state (Lia, 2006), but a transitional regime 
with limited administrative, security, and legislative powers over 
limited areas in the West Bank and Gaza.  
Second, it is obvious that the SSR is a key challenge in Palestine in 
order to advance a state building agenda, to end Israeli occupation 
and to deal with lawlessness and the deteriorating internal security 
situation. The main challenges facing the Palestinian security sector 
must be considered within the political context created by two factors: 
Israeli occupation and international political fragmentation. This study 
argues that the precondition to achieve a successful and sustainable 
SSR in Palestine is to overcome these challenges. All elements that 
should be incorporated into any comprehensive SSR for the 
Palestinian context are strongly related to these two challenges 
whether developing democratic governance and accountability; 
creating an appropriate institutional framework or strengthening the 
professionalism and operational effectiveness of the security services 
(Weinberger, 1995; Brynen, 2008). 
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I. Theoretical Approach: The Context of the Palestinian 
Security Reform 
 
The security sector reform or SSR is a relatively recent concept. 
Since the late 1990s, it has entered in the field of security studies and 
international development aid as a means to the transformation of 
security services towards greater democratic accountability and 
transparency as well as effectiveness in providing security for the 
country’s citizens (Brzoska, 2003: 13-14). The security services should 
be controlled by and accountable to democratically elected civilian 
authorities, and should act on the rule of law (Hänggi, 2004: 3-20). The 
SSR is recognized as among the central elements to consolidating 
democracy, promoting development, conflict prevention and the 
success in post-conflict peace-building. This would be incomplete and 
limited at best, if it does not include the security services. 
There are two joined concepts to the SSR: security and governance. 
Both concepts have undergone change in recent decades, particularly 
with the demise of the Cold War. Today, security is not understood in 
state-centric terms or military threats. It is extended to non-military 
issues affecting both states and peoples due to the emergence of a 
number of serious global threats, which have been aggravated by 
globalization. Regarding governance, it concerns the ways in which 
the management of security institutions and issues serve the needs of 
citizens and the state (Brzoska, 2003: 13-14). The good governance 
incorporates all the security actors in the decision-making process, 
who refer not only to the armed forces, the police and the intelligence 
services, but also to the constitutional and political institutions that 
should guide and oversee them. So the SSR is understood to be a 
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comprehensive reform process the aim of which is making these 
institutions more legitimate, apolitical and accountable to individual 
citizens and communities and more responsive to their security needs 
(Ball, 2010:30).  
In considering SSR from a donor perspective, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) argues that “SSR 
seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of 
security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with 
democratic norms and sound principles of governance, and the rule of 
law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of 
more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and 
policing” (OECD, 2005).  
The SSR is a process and a set of policy mechanisms that could be 
helpful for both non-democratic to resolve their security-deficit, and 
fully democratic regimes to improve the effectiveness of their security 
services with a focus on the transparency and adapting new 
capabilities. In addition, the theory and practice of the SSR is largely 
related to the concept of the conflict and democratic transition. The 
following table summarizes all the dimensions of the correlation 
between these concepts that imply needs and potentials for reforms. 
In light of these three periods that characterize the life cycle of the 
conflict, certain conclusions should be drawn regarding the Palestinian 
case. First of all, there is no single model, because SSR differs from 
country to country. In other words, there are wide variances in 
contexts and conditions for the implementation of SSR. This entails to 
think of a new SSR model more attuned to the specific challenges and 
national experiences for the Palestinian case. The national, regional 
and international environments in which the Palestinian SSR will take 
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heavily influence its progress. This reform is likely to fail if some 
specific priorities and needs are not taken into account.  
The Palestinian SSR is fundamentally embedded in the stage of 
conflict resolution as a key component of each peace strategy. It is 
obvious that SSR is complicated by the so-called “peace process” and, 
accordingly, governmental and non-governmental responses to this 
issue must be guided by the obstacle of the Israeli occupation. In the 
Palestinian case, SSR and conflict resolution will be best able to work 
together when those committed to building peace work to address 
structural sources of the Arab-Israeli conflict. SSR principles can act as 
a lever for the conflicting parties to come to fair agreements in peace 
negotiations, but actually in terms of Oslo agreements present a major 
obstacle to peaceful resolution by exacerbating differences between 
Palestinians on one side, and Israel and international donors on the 
other.  
In terms of the third stage of life cycle of the conflict, all 
characteristics of the reconstruction’s period can be found in the 
Palestinian case.  In this regard, Yezid Sayigh states that Palestine is a 
fractured society with a “[…] deep domestic disagreement over what 
constitutes the national interest, and a lack of consensus about the 
nature and aims of security. Struggles for control over the security 
sector are endemic, with weak or fragmentary legal frameworks and 
decision-making structures that are opaque or of contested 
constitutionality” (Sayigh, 2009:1-2). In the same vein, Nathan Brown 
argues that “the performance of the [Palestinian] security services is 
closely related to issues of authoritarianism, human rights violations, 
and corruption” (Brown, 2005:16). The SSR is needed to promote a 
new image of the Palestinian security services not as symbolic of a lack 
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of freedom and violation of human rights or as extensions of executive 
power, but rather as a tool to guarantee the rule of law. In this regard, 
SSR is a fundamental driver for political reform, because this process 
has a democratic character and looks to establish respectful interaction 
between the state and its population based on the principals of 
security governance. For this reason, SSR must be integrated to 
reinforce political reform and to resolve the contested legitimacy of 
Palestinian Authority (PA) that remains an authoritarian regime 
(Brown, 2005:5).  Security reform was high on President Abbas’s 
agenda when he came to power in January 2005 and still a key issue in 
the relationship between PA and international donors, in particular 
the United States and the European Union. Azmi al-Shu’aibi outlines 
several laws adopted over the past decade such among which are 
Service Law for the Palestinian Security Forces; Retirement and Health 
Insurance Law for the Palestinian security forces; Intelligence Agency 
Law; Civil Defense Law; and decree concerning a Preventive Security 
Law (Al-Shu’aibi, 2012: 4). In parallel, other reform initiatives were 
implemented to “ […] restructuring of the Interior Ministry; […] 
prioritizing the people’s need for security; […] addressing negative 
manifestations that reflect lack of self-control and social restraint by 
the security forces; reinforcing the principles of loyalty to the PNA, 
and to the security service as a profession, based on the sense of 
national pride; and raising the public’s awareness regarding the 
various necessary measures, to ensure its understanding, cooperation 
and support” (Al-Shu’aibi, 2012: 7). However, reform achievements 
still limited and delayed due to the non-democratic character of 
Palestinian regime. Security and law enforcement sector reform 
remained unsatisfactory, with no major progress in terms of five 
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democratic standards of SSR: constitutional and legal framework 
based on the principle of separation of powers; civilian control and 
management of the security sector by the government, parliamentary 
control and oversight of the security sector; judicial control in the sense 
that the security sector is subject to the civilian justice system; and 
public control. 
 
II. The Challenges of the Israeli Occupation 
 
The challenge of the occupation covers many different external 
and domestic threats. So any discussion of SSR entails two 
fundamental elements: the Palestinians’ feeling of insecurity caused by 
Israeli occupation; and the link between Palestinian SSR and the 
“peace process”.   
The feeling of insecurity - that does not cease to grow - is a major 
concern for Palestinian SSR caused by Israeli occupation. This covers 
all regions and many different aspects of the Palestinian daily life. 
Beyond internal causes of instability, such as local armed groups, 
corruption and crime; the poor socioeconomic conditions of the 
majority of Palestinians cannot be separated from the presence of the 
settlements, Israeli military occupation, the Israeli raids and 
checkpoints as the main threats to their security (DCAF/IUED, 2005). 
The sense of insecurity in terms of economic instability and the 
increase in poverty and unemployment rates amongst Palestinians are 
also directly related to a number of physical obstacles to internal 
mobility in the Palestinian territories. These mobility restrictions 
imposed by Israel prevent Palestinian security forces from controlling 
the territory and also hamper seriously the Agency’s humanitarian 
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operations, for example, the restrictions on the staff of UNRWA (Bocco, 
2006: 11-26). To this is added, of course, the impact of the Separation 
Barrier – that will be 670 kilometers in length – on the lives and 
livelihoods of Palestinian households in the West Bank. 
The Israeli occupation is the main external obstacle to the goal of 
reform in terms of achieving security for the Palestinian population 
and satisfying its basic needs. Palestinian security forces – that their 
infrastructures were completely destroyed by the Occupation over the 
past years - operate under very difficult circumstances.  
Moreover, the Palestinian SSR is inextricably linked to the peace 
agreements, which include the Oslo Agreement (1993), the Cairo 
Agreement (1994), the Interim Agreement (1995), the Hebron Protocol 
(1997), the Wye Memorandum (1998), and Roadmap (2003). According 
to all these agreements, Palestinian obligations are to maintain 
international Palestinian security and to fight terror and violence. The 
Performance-Based Roadmap to Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict states the following elements summarized in 
the figure 1:  
 
Figure 1. Palestinian Roadmap Obligations with Respect to 
Security① 
                                                        
① source: The Performance-Based Roadmap to Permanent Two-State Solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, http://www.wn.org/news/dh/mideast/roadmp1 
22002. pdf. 
• Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism 
and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and 
restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent 
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attacks on Israelis anywhere. 
• Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus to 
begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at 
confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist 
capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation 
of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of 
association with terror and corruption. 
• GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, 
attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian 
homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli 
construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; 
and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan. 
• Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, 
Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with 
the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its 
implementation. 
• Implementation, as previously agreed, of US rebuilding, training and 
resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside 
oversight board (US–Egypt–Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to 
achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire. 
•All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three 
services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister. 
• Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF 
counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other 
undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including 
regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of US security 
officials. 
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Hani Albasoos, former Lieutenant Officer in the Palestinian Police, 
concludes that these peace agreements do not define concretely the 
scope and mission of Palestinian security forces. The big issue for him is 
to know: “Did the Israeli authors of the agreements mean that 
Palestinian police could use all their powers to protect the population 
in the self-ruled areas against all forms of threat, including external 
ones, or did they mean, in a narrower perspective, that Palestinian 
policing abilities should be limited to the prevention and repression of 
internal threats, such as those from armed groups opposed to the Oslo 
agreements?” (Albasoos, 2005: 21). Another conclusion is that there is 
a contradictory mandate between the provision of security for the 
Palestinians and the necessity of providing security to Israel. It is 
assigned to the Palestinian Authority, by these agreements, to work in 
close cooperation with Israeli security services (Lagerquist, 2003: 5-20). 
This situation is usually used by Western donors, in particular the 
United States and the European Union, to exert more pressure on the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) to dismantle Islamist groups (Zanotti, 2013: 
• Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of 
support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror. 
• All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel 
these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance’s Single 
Treasury Account. 
• As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF 
withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 
and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 
28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF. 
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3). In this regard, the United States, in terms of its commitments under 
the Oslo Accords, launched, since 2005, an assistance program to help 
Palestinians to transform and professionalize their security sector. But, 
after the Hamas victory in the parliamentary election of January 2006, 
the US Administration restructured and reduced its aid programs to 
PA, which should find ways to keep cooperation open with Israel in 
security sphere and act to control “violence”. For its part, the European 
Union has two security missions which remain present in the 
Palestinian territories: the EU Police Mission (EUPOL-COPPS) that 
went into effect in January 2006 to train and advise the Palestinian 
civil police; and the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing 
Point (EU BAM Rafah) that began on November 25, 2005 with the 
mission to provide a third-party presence to monitor the passage of 
people at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) in the Gaza Strip. All of 
these initiatives and programs are a direct result of the Oslo process.  
Overall, it is very hard for Palestinians to define their security in a 
national framework due to the issue of occupation. This conclusion is 
shared by the International Crisis Group, which argues that the 
Palestinian SSR is further “complicated by the manner of cooperation, 
which the PA sees as overly one-sided, an asymmetric exercise in 
complying with Israeli orders. Repeated, oftentimes unjustified and 
almost always humiliating IDF (Israel Defense Forces) incursions into 
Palestinian cities, as well as strict limitations imposed on PSF 
(Palestinian Security Forces) areas of operation, undermine the 
symbols and reality of indigenous empowerment” (International Crisis 
Group, 2010: i).  
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III. The Challenge of the Internal Political Division 
 
The SSR is highly constrained by the dynamic of intra-Palestinian 
relations, namely the power struggles between Fatah and Hamas. 
Without unity between the political Palestinian factions, SSR will be 
impossible. In other words, implementing an inclusive reform requires 
a real national dialogue that should not come from above, but with the 
involvement of the civil society, political factions and Palestinian 
security forces in order to engage all actors in the reform process. 
The major result of this Palestinian internal struggle is the 
politicization of the security forces and the lack of professionalism. 
The loyalties of security personnel lie with the commanders instead of 
national institutions. The security situation became more complex after 
the 2006 legislative elections and the bloody clashes in the Gaza Strip 
in 2007: there are effectively two governments, one based in Gaza and 
the other in the West Bank, with each government having its own 
security forces. The appropriate concept that could describe this state 
of flux is feudalization (ASSIA-DCAF, 2006: 23) of the Palestinian SSR 
by Fatah and Hamas, which appeared clearly in the approach of 
recruitment based on partisan character and militia behavior. This is 
why it is difficult to develop a coherent strategy for DDR 
(Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration) in order to restore 
all Palestinian security forces into one national structure. The lack of 
professionalism and effectiveness due to the low morale of the 
security personnel is also the result of this fragmentation. The latter 
hampers the capacity of Palestinian security services to create and 
build a culture of professionalism. This means that the work of the 
security forces should never be affected by political factionalism in 
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order to provide the security needs to all Palestinians, regardless of 
their political affiliation. 
It is obvious that in terms of internal challenges for Palestinian 
SSR is to build national unity and find consensus among all 
Palestinian stakeholders on a national security policy. If the perception 
of security for Palestinians traditionally linked to Israeli occupation, it 
should also be viewed with the negative impacts of internal political 
fragmentation: the contradictory interests of the various political 
parties and their security services. The unity is the key entry point to 
define a new concept of Palestinian security. Major-General Jibril 
Rajoub, former head of the Preventive Security Force in the West Bank, 
argues “that there are two contradictory visions of Palestinian security. 
The first vision is to preserve the security institutions established in 
the framework of the Oslo Agreements and keep them intact. The 
second vision is to engage in an open conflict with Israel” 
(DCAF-Shams Forum, 2008:2). Fatah represents the first vision due to 
its transformation from a revolutionary movement to a territorial 
political entity with international recognition. However, Hamas is 
associated with the second one because it is identified as a movement 
attached to original values of the Palestinian revolutionary movement. 
This kind of polarization prevents the definition of a common 
perception of threats, and to accomplish the Palestinian national 
project, particularly in terms of state-building.  
The most urgent need for Palestinian SSR is to regain national 
unity as a solution for two main concerns:  
First, the formulation of a Palestinian National Security Policy 
(NSP) to adopt a shared understanding of what security means for 
Palestinians and to establish a coherent security decision-making. In 
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this regard, DCAF states that NSP “[…] has a present and future role, 
outlining the core interests of the nation and setting guidelines for 
addressing current and prospective threats and opportunities. It seeks 
to integrate and coordinate the contributions of national security 
actors in response to the interests and threats deemed most important. 
There are five main reasons for states to have an integrated and 
detailed NSP: to ensure that the government addresses all threats in a 
comprehensive manner; to increase the effectiveness of the security 
sector by optimizing contributions from all security actors; to guide 
the implementation of policy; to build domestic consensus; [and] to 
enhance regional and international confidence and cooperation” 
(DCAF, 2005: 1). With this vision SSR is a “Palestinian national 
necessity and not merely a response to external pressure” or only a 
reaction to the Israeli occupation (ASSIA-DCAF, 2006: 23).  
Second, the positive impact of national unity should be to 
restructure the different Palestinian security forces and to improve 
cooperation between the different institutions in the security sector. 
The Palestinian security apparatus is composed of numerous 
intelligence and security agencies. They include many Palestinian 
Liberation Armies that continue to believe in resistance to Israeli 
occupation, and at least a dozen different security branches, which 
created following the Oslo Agreement (1993) and directly related 
Palestinian Authority such as Public Security Force, Palestinian Civil 
Police Force, Preventive Security Force, General Intelligence or 
Mukhabarat, Military Intelligence, Navy Police, Presidential Security 
Force and Operations Force (Hussein, 2006: 45-70). The confusion and 
much duplication that exist between all of these apparatuses and 
absence of clear missions do not contribute to the effective delivery of 
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 8, No. 3, 2014 
 118
law and order to the population. In addition, the spreading state of 
anarchy and lawlessness in the Occupied Palestinian Territories was 
sometimes due to the power struggle among rival Palestinian security 
services. These forces had made mistakes that resulted in the loss of 
legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the citizens. 
In fact, the challenge of reform is to centralize command and 
control of the security apparatus with a clear separation of powers to 
build effective security capabilities. The idea is to integrate all agencies 
that serve the interests of security into a coherent national structure 
containing only three types of security forces: national security forces, 
internal security forces, and intelligence agencies. The current 
conditions and structure illustrate that Palestinian Security forces are 
not a conventional armed force capable of projecting power beyond its 
borders and to protect the population against Israeli military actions 
and incursions. However, they can do more to establish law and 
internal order in the cities of the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Israeli occupation and internal political division described and 
analyzed in this study are major challenges for Palestinian SSR. The 
occupation still poses hard difficulties in terms of mobility, 
fragmentation of territory, construction and expansion of settlements 
and erection of the separation barrier. So it is vital to consider this 
reform in the life cycle of Arab Israeli-conflict as mentioned in Table 1. 
However, Palestinians can and must improve governance of their 
security sector without hiding the fact that the other face of the 
problem is home-grown. In other words, the stake for them is the 
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political fractions about the distribution of power that prevents the 
enhancement of the image of Palestinian security sector and provides 
a better service to the people.  
In addition, this reform is not an end in itself, but is a necessary 
and fundamental element to achieve the Palestinian national project in 
terms of liberation and state-building. Its agenda is complex and it is 
not limited to the structural or organizational dimensions, but it has a 
political issue that requires a comprehensive political process in order 
to involve all governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the 
security sector to identify a Palestinian National Security Policy. 
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